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Unmeasurable Damages and a Yardstick
By JACK H. WElcmcxK*
DAMAGES for pain and suffering have been incorrectly termed
"unmeasurable damages."' Since the issue involving such damages is
present in all personal injury litigation and since it must be conceded
that the law requires compensation for pain and suffering where
proved to exist as the proxinate result of defendant's tortious conduct,2
this discussion will examine the reasons for the erroneous designation
of pain and suffering as "unmeasurable damages," the results of apply-
mg this erroneous concept to the trial of a personal injury case, tech-
mques for proving and arguing these damages to the trier of fact, and
the most effective methods by which the trier of fact can place a value
upon them. In this analysis, attention will focus upon pertinent law
and current and preferred practices of determining damages, 3 in the
expectation that certain modifications may be made in both law and
procedure in this vital but unnecessarily mysterious area.
While, for the sake of conveience, only pain and suffering are
referred to herein, the factors to be considered would be applicable to
other forms of damages, such as loss of comfort, society and protec-
tion.4
While the terminology adopted in this article has broad and general
usage, the demand for uniformity necessitates the use of certain work-
* A.B., 1938, San Francisco State College; LL.B., 1949, Hastings College of the Law.
Member, San Francisco Bar; Instructor in Law, Hastings College of the Law. President,
California Trial Lawyers' Association. The author acknowledges the research assistance
of Mr. James E. Mahoney of the Hastings Law Journal.1 Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 95-103, 138 A.2d 713, 719-723 (1958).
2 Tort litigation alone is considered herein, and the assumption is made throughout
that in all instances the liability of the tortfeasor has been clearly established. The ap-
proach herein is that of a trial attorney, drawing upon hIs personal experiences as his
impressions formed after observation of, and discussion with, trial lawyers in all parts of
the United States. An attempt has also been made to review comprehensively the most
recent literature on these subjects.
3 The author has intentionally confined this article to a consideration of those aspects
of general damages permitted by Califorma and the majority of American jurisdictions.
Abstract consideration of such related subjects as causes of action for mental distress
alone, alienation of affection, or loss of consortium-recognized in fewer ]unsdictions-has
been avoided. Also omitted is consideration of related topics such as reduction to present
value of awards for pain and suffering, the applicability of the "Botta rule" to wrongful
death cases, advisability of informing the jury about the amount of the prayer or ad
damnum clause of the complaimt use of the blackboard or charts in argument, etc.
4 See Appendix A infra.
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mg definitions. Fundamentally, "damages" is used in its economic sense
and not m a manner descriptive of injury or destruction.5 It is used to
designate a sum of money awarded to a person injured by the tortious
conduct of another6 by way of "compensation for detriment from the
unlawful act or omission of another."7 "Compensatory damages" de-
note those damages "awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity
or restitution for harm sustained by hun."" "Detriment" is defined as
"a loss or harm suffered in person or property,"9 ,.e., the injury or
destruction itself.
The search for an appropriate definition of "pam" presents greater
semantic difficulties. As an example, "pae" has been defined as "a more
or less localized sensation of discomfort, distress or agony resulting
from the stmulation of specialized nerve endings."1 Such a definition
constitutes a rather unsatisfying analysis and manifestly would tend to
heighten rather than diminish the perplexity of the judge or attorney
confronted with tis phenomenon. "Parn," more comprehensively,
albeit more techmcally, has been described as
a psychobiologic phenomenon with both physical and emotional com-
ponents. This dual aspect of pain is linked to the distinction between
perception of pain and reaction to pain. Perception of parn may be
evaluated in terms of quality and intensity, while reaction to pamn is
manifested by such symptoms as tachycardia (excessively rapid heart
beat), anxiety, fear, paic and prostration."1
"The rigid dichotomy of organic pain versus psychogemc pamn has
become obsolete, and pain must be considered and approached dim-
cally as a Gestalt problem ",12 Pam may alternatively be referred to
as lancmating, sharp, dull, smarting, exquisite, shooting, severe, mild,
local, generalized, torienting, agomzmg or intense.
"Suffering" is a more comprehensive expression denoting a broader
5 This usage is compelled by the Anglo-American practice of pecuniary compensation
for injury in the form of "damages" which theoretically equal and offset the detriment
suffered by the victim. Since the element of pain and suffering is practically never absent
from personal injury litigation, it is vital that this semantic distinction ultimately be
eliminated by nimizing the uncertainty of the transition from destruction to indemnity.
6 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 902 (1939).
7 Perlns v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 720, 769, 132 P.2d 70,
99 (1942).
8 RESTATEmENT, TORTS §§ 901, 903 (1939).
9 WEBsm's NEw CoL.zGIAT r DICIONARY (Merriam ed. 1961).
10 Dow. sn'S MEDICAL DicTIONAny (24th ed. 1965).
1 1 FINNESON, DIAGNOSis AND MANAGEMENT OF PAN SYNDROMES 15 (Saunders ed.
1962).
12 Cooper & Braceland, Psychosomatic Aspects of Pam, 34 MED. Crqincs OF NoRTH
AmmcA 981 (1950).
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concept than pam, since it lacks the rigidity which comes from mclu-
sion in a standard scientific vocabulary In the field of torts, "suffering"
includes such conditions as worry, anxmety, embarrassment, humilia-
tion, mental anguish or torment, shock, fight, fear, apprehension,
terror, grief, sorrow, ordeal, nervousness and the like. This concept is
properly used in the courtroom, despite its broad scope, for it is de-
scriptive of matters which will be in issue under varying circumstances.
There is complete agreement with regard to the propriety of award-
ing damages for pam and suffering arising out of tortious conduct.13
This is simply illustrated by the following axioms:
"[W]hoever does an injury to another is liable in damages to the
extent of that injury"14
"A person injured by the tort of another is entitled to recover damages
from hun for all harm, past, present and prospective, legally caused
by the tort."' 5
The plaintiff may recover damages for physical pain and for mental
suffering which result from or accompany the physical injury 'I
"The law does not prescribe any definite standard by which to com-
pensate an injured person for pain and suffering; nor does it require
that any witness should have expressed an opinion as to the amount
of damages that would compensate for such injury "'7
The jurors may estimate such damages from the facts and circum-
stances in evidence and by considering them in connection with their
own knowledge and experience in the affairs of life.'8
However, there is an absence of uniformity in the procedures for
determining and in the amount of damages awarded for pam and
suffering, even where there are qualitatively and quantitatively com-
parable injuries, regardless of whether comparisons are made within a
given state or between various states. How does this occur in light of
the universal recognition of the right to compensation? The obvious
answer is diversity in interpretation of the law by judges and in appli-
cation of the law by triers of fact because of variations in trial proce-
dures, proof, argument, and instructions, complicated by the absence
of a fixed value for a given non-pecuniary detriment. With an in-
13 "[Whoever does an mjury to another is liable m damages to the extent of that
injury." Dexter v. Spear, 7 Fed. Cas. 624 (No. 3, 867) (C.C.D.R.I. 1825).
14 Ibid.
1 5 RESTATEMEN, TORTs § 910 (1939).
16 Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 158 Cal. 499, 111 Pac. 534 (1910).
17 1 CAr. oRNm-. Juay INsmnucroNs, Civil 174-m (4th ed. 1956).
18 Wiley v. Young, 178 Cal. 681, 687, 174 Pac. 316, 318 (1918).
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creasing number of compensable injuries and deaths in our society
have come injustices afflicting the victim whose compensation may
depend upon the random factors of geography, obsolete or provincial
interpretations of the law, or the haphazard, "by guess and by golly"
effort of inadequately instructed juries. 9
The law is silent as to any uniform method for valuation by the
]udge or jury of damages for pam and suffering. Since personal injury
cases occupy the greatest amount of the courts' time on the civil side,20
and since the valuation of damages for pamn and suffering presents one
of the greatest and most unique challenges to the successful admmis-
tration of justice, it is necessary that our judicial system adopt a urn-
form solution. This would conform to the trend in the United States of
eliminating vagaries, disparities and injustices among the various juris-
dictions by adopting uniform codes, court rules and procedures. Such
trends toward uniformity are remedial rather than restrictive and seek
to assure the same quality of justice to all litigants. This same type of
uniformity can be and must be provided in this area of damages for
pain and suffering, either under existing laws, which are broad enough
to permit a satisfactory, uniform solution, or by legislative fiat2" if the
courts of any jurisdiction disagree with the uniform solution selected.
Methods of Proof
The uncertain state of the law, differences in experience and tram-
ing among lawyers, differences between jurisdictions with respect to
rules, varying beliefs and practices of trial judges, and varying fact
patterns and injuries combine to produce great variance in the methods
of proving and evaluating damages for pain and suffering. Sometimes,
the effect of pain and suffering is so obvious that no additional proof
is required.22 The behavior of the plaintiff at trial may be sufficient
evidence to support an award.23 However, this is an infrequent situa-
19 Continental Bus System, Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S.W.2d 153, 165 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959).2 0 This conclusion was reached from an investigation by the author as President of
the California Trial Lawyers' Association and from the fact that 14 out of 22 superior
court judges in San Francisco during 1965, along with extra-session judges assigned by
the Judicial Council to preside over trials in San Francisco, were assigned, for the most
part, to the trial of jury cases. See CoNAiD, AuTOMOBILE AccrDENT CosTs AND PAYmES
225-55 (1964) (reporting the experiences m Michigan).2 1 In 1960, the Georgia Legislature enacted a law expressly authorizing use of the
per diem argument in jury trials. 81 GA. CODE ANN. § 1015 (Supp. 1962).
22 Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 42 Cal. App. 2d 669,
109 P.2d 716 (1941).
23 "It appears, therefore, that it was not necessary that the award for pain and
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tion. Absent such conspicuous injury, it is still possible to prove dam-
ages for pain and suffering with the degree of certainty required by
law An obvious source of evidence is the direct examination of the
plaintiff.
Q. How did the accident happen?
A. I was stopped at a stop light and my car was struck from behind.
Q. What happened to your body at the time of the impact?
A. I was thrown back against the seat, my head went back over the
top of the seat and seemed to be coming off my neck; then I was
thrown forward and hit the steering wheel with my chest and then
my head hit something and that is all I remember until I woke up
in the hospital.Q. Do you know how you got to the hospital?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Do you remember being removed from your automobile?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Do you remember being taken into an ambulance?
A. No, I don't.Q. Do you remember being taken into the emergency room at the
emergency hospital?
A. No, I don't.Q. Do you remember being moved from that hospital to the Uni-
versity of California Hospital?
A. No, I don't.
Q. What is your first recollection about being m the hospital?
A. I heard someone say, "He's waking. Shall we start the anes-
thetic?" And someone answered, "No, we'd better not take a
chance yet." Then I passed out again.Q. How did you feel during that conscious penod?
A. I felt like I was completely paralyzed but with a terrible pressure
in my head and my chest.Q. What is your next recollection about being in the hospital?
A. I woke up in a darkened room. I didn't know where I was. I
saw shadows moving and for a little while thought I was dead.
Then my head cleared a little more and I could see a nurse on
the side of the bed, I had a tube in my nose and a needle in my
arm connected to a tube in a bottle. I tried to move and felt
a tube connected to my male organ. My head was being held
by some land of holder that I later saw, they looked like the
iceman's tongs, and they pulled on my head toward the top of
the bed. I had bandages around my body very tight under my
arms and down to my stomach and I couldn't breathe much but
I didn't want to because with every breath I took, it seemed
like a knife was being stuck into my lungs. I was a mess.Q. What care and treatment did you get then?
sufferng, if any, be supported by medical testimony "Mendoza v. Rudolph, 140
Cal. App. 2d 633, 637, 295 P.2d 445, 448 (1956).
December, 1965] UNMEASURABLE DAMAGES
A. I had wonderful doctors and nurses. They really took care of
me. The nurses were in my room every hour with medicines, pamn
mections, carng for the tubes, moving me from side to side,
giving me sleeping pills so I could get a little rest, feeding me,
because it hurt for me to move or to try to do anything for my-
self for about two weeks. If it hadn't been for those doctors, I
would have died. They operated on me twice and saw me twice
a day while I was in the hospital.
Q. How long were you in the hospital?
A. Six weeks.
Q. Were you put to sleep for the operations?
A. Yes.
Q. How did you feel after the operations?
A. I was very sick-I don't know if it was from the anesthetic or
my injuries. I had nurses around the clock for a week after each
one.
Q. How did you feel between the operations?
A. Well, I was in pain all the time, but I tried to keep my mind off
the pain by reading the Bible. It was tolerable most of the day,
with the help of the pain shots, but some days and every night,
it was horrible, ]ust lying there waiting for the pain to go away.
I prayed for a little relief, but after the effect of the pain shots
wore off, I couldn't get another for a while. But after about the
third or fourth week, it seemed like four years, there was less
pain, and it gradually went away from my chest, and my neck
and I had pain around my head for a while. But the body cast
bothered me very much.Q. Describe the body cast that was put on you at the hospital.
A. It went from under my arms, over my chest and upper back,
over my shoulders and over my neck and over my head. It had
openings for the top of my head, my ears, eyes and mouth.
Q. When did they put the cast on?
A. After the second week, when they took the traction off.
Q. How long did you have the cast on?
A. Three months.
Q. How did you get along in the cast?
A. That was almost as bad as the worst pain, because I couldn't
open my mouth very wide, because it held my jaw up, and I
had to turn my body to look to the side. And I itched. It seemed
that someone had turned loose a million fleas inside that cast
and I couldn't scratch. It was torture.
Q. How long were you confined to bed in the hospital?
A. I had this traction on for about two weeks. I was in bed for two
weeks.Q. Did you have any bathroom privileges?
A. No, I had to have continuous traction, so I couldn't move away
from the bed until they put the cast on.Q. After the two week period in bed, how active were you?
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A. I could get up, with help, and had bathroom privileges. I sat up
in a chair for an hour at a time, except I kept getting dizzy, and
had to lie down sooner sometimes, and the cast bothered me.Q. How many doctors did you have while you were in the hospital?
A. Not counting the interns and residents, five doctors were on
my case.Q. Tell us about them.
A. Well, there was the neurosurgeon, Dr. Black, and the skin doc-
tor, Dr. White, and the lung doctor, Dr. Green and the bone
doctor, Dr. Brown, and the intestine doctor, Dr. GrayQ. What did Dr. Black do for you?
A. He took care of my broken neck and my head injury. He operated
on me once.Q. What did Dr. Brown do for you?
A. He worked with Dr. Black on my neck and also he worked on
my broken ribs.
Q. What did Dr. White do for you?
A. Well, I got bed sores from being in bed, and the cast caused skin
irritation and rashes, and he treated that. One time, while Dr.
White was visiting me, I itched so bad I started to cry. He got
a clothes hanger, wrapped a towel around it and put it under
the cast and scratched.Q. What did Dr. Green do for you?
A. He worked on my lungs in the operation when they fixed my
ribs and treated me for the lung condition after that.
Q. What did Dr. Gray do for you?
A. I don't know how to describe it, except I had trouble with my
intestines, they stopped working right after the accident, and
he had to get them started again.
9. Did you see the doctors after you left the hospital?
A. Yes, I don't remember the dates, but I kept going to their offices
after.Q. Did you see any other doctors after you left the hospital?
A. Yes, I got so nervous and depressed, that Dr. Black sent me to
Dr. Tan.Q. What is his field of medicine?
A. Dr. Tan is a psychiatrist.
Q. How many times did you go to see Dr. Tan?
A. I don't know. I went every day the first few weeks, then twice
a week for about three months and now I go once every week.
Q. What and of treatment do you receive from Dr. Tan?
A. Psychotherapy
Q. When did you first see Dr. Tan?
A. About two months after I left the hospital.
Q. Did you have cast changes?
A. Only one after I left the hospital.
Q. Did you have any pain after leaving the hospital?
A. Only occasionally while I was in the cast, but continuously after
UNMEASURABLE DAMAGESDecember, 1965]
the cast was removed. They prescribed a Thomas collar, to hold
my head and neck in a fixed position, but even then, I had pain
with it. That's why they suggested a fusion of the spine of my
neck. But they were afraid of the cord and wouldn't do the
operation because I might come out of the operation completely
paralyzed.Q. Did you receive pain medication?
A. Yes, I had to have some pamn medication all the time. But the
danger of becoming a dope addict was so great, they have to
change the medicines and leave me off them for a while.
Q. How do you feel without them?
A. I suffer.
Q. How long did you wear the Thomas collar?
A. I wear it all the time when I move around very much. I can
remove it when I'm inside, like now, but not for long.
Q. How do you feel when you go without it?
A. I have more pamn.
Q. How do you feel now?
A. Well, as you can see, I try to avoid moving my head or neck
because every slight movement causes a twinge of pain.Q. Do you have any difficulty with any other part of your body
now?
A. No, my chest has recovered completely as far as I can tell. The
doctor told me that I would have to have continuous observa-
tion for the rest of my life-periodic examinations, because of
the scars and blebs left on my lungs. My head is much better
except for occasional dizziness and some headaches. But my
neck is troublesome and my nerves are shot.
Q. Did you have any trouble with your head, neck or chest before
this accident?
A. No.
Q. Have you done any work since this accident?
A. Well, I can't hold down a cook's job- anymore. I have gone to
the State Rehabilitation Center and asked them if they could
help to rehabilitate me so that I could find some ]ob to help
me earn something. But they put me through all the tests and
examinations and couldn't do anything for me.
Q. How is the condition for which you went to the psychiatrist?
A. I am still a nervous wreck. I can't ride in an automobile any-
more without being terrified. I have lost my sense of judging
whether cars are too close or too far and I worry all the time.
I am embarrassed with the brace and with my inability to move
normally. I'm so depressed at not being able to work and earn
a living. I've never taken a cent of charity in my life and it almost
kills me to have to be helped around like an invalid at my age.
I cry often now, without any reason that I know about, juSt
like a child. I can't sleep much at mght. I get up and read or
just walk around the house. Sometimes, so I won't wake up the
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rest of the family, I get dressed and go out and just walk around
until I get tired.Q. Have you noticed any change or unprovement with your psycho-
therapy?
A. No, it just keeps me going, but I haven't noticed any improve-
ment. If I was just able to do some kind of work, but they've
tried everything. I tried working with my hands, but I couldn't
do that for longer than a few minutes at a time, and it made me
so nervous, I had to give that up. Then I tried reading to sick
people, but I made them nervous and they made me nervous,
I couldn't do that. The thought that I can't provide for my family
and myself haunts me every minute.
It is obvious that such testimony supports argument for compen-
sation for pam and suffering by the day, hour, minute or second. The
only remaining question would pertain to the value for each unit
of time to be selected by the jury
Another method of proving the effect of pam and suffering is the
introduction of the testimony of those who knew the plaintiff prior
to the injury and who have observed him following the injury so as
to be able to report changes resulting from the injury For example,
in one case, plaintiffs fellow worker, his son and has clergyman testi-
fied to this effect.
Plaintiff's fellow worker testified:
Before the accident he was the best worker in the plant. He always
did more than was expected of him. He came to work early and
left late. Everybody knew that he loved his work and the guys he
worked with. If we had heavy work to do, he pitched in and always
did more than his share. If any of us ran into trouble with a piece
of work, or were delayed in getting it out, he would offer to help
and did. He always did a fine job. I never worked with a racer guy
or one who was better liked and respected by his boss and fellow
workmen.
But after the accident, something happened. When he was in the
hospital, everybody at work missed him and visited him in the hos-
pital. When he first came back, we expected that he would have to
take it easy and we all wanted to help him. But after a while, it
was obvious that he just wasn't recovering to his usual self like he
was before the accident. He tired easily He never complained, but
we could see that when he tried to do heavy work, he couldn't lift,
without a groan or without the sweat pouring down over his face.
He was slow in straightening up or getting up from a chair or a
kneeling position. He always held hIs back when he did. He didn't
joke with the men like before and hardly ever smiled or laughed.
We all knew from his slow walking and bending that it hurt hun
just to move. One time he was in such pain after being in a stooped
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position, that when he straightened up he held on to me without
moving for just a minute, saying "Oh, Holy Mary, Mother of God."
His son testified:
Before he got hurt my dad was lots of fun. We went places and did
things together. He liked to take me hunting and fishing. We played
baseball together. We wrestled and boxed. He was my pal and fun
to be with. But now, he doesn't feel good. He's so tired when he's
not working, that he rests all the time. We haven't been able to
play anymore or go fishing or hunting. He tries to pay attention to
me, but his face looks like he hurts.
Plaintiff's clergyman testified:
Tom was one of the leaders in our church. He and his family were
always in church on Sundays and participated m the meetings and
socials at the church. He was a happy man, but not anymore. Since
this accident, he is a different man. The pain he is suffering is ob-
vious on his face and in his movements. It is very sad to see the
terrible effect of this accident on this man.
Expert testimony most often is necessary to assist in evaluating
given types and amounts of pain and suffering with given results or
effects upon the particular plaintiff. Experts can present evidence as
to the character of the pain, its past history, its fluctuations, its ex-
pected duration, its potential changes, and the effect it has had and
will have on the plaintiff.24 The latter testimony can include the
amount of disability which will becaused and the loss of normal liv-
ing which will result. On this basis, medical opinions are available
as to units of time by which each particular type of pain and disability
can be measured, and the loss suffered by plaintiff can thus be estab-
lished.
Q. Doctor, why does plaintiff still have pamn two years after he sus-
tained this fracture into his ankle joint?
A. The ankle joint bears weight. The lining of the joint is cartilage
which became roughened as a result of the fracture. It is no
longer a smooth joint or socket. Weight bearng and movement
cause pain.Q. How much pain will plaintiff have from this condition in the
future?
A. He will continue to have this pain for the rest of Ins life every
time this joint bears weight or is moved.
Even if it be assumed that the particular injuries, although painful
or debilitating, are uncommon or are difficult to describe m terms of
24 See Appendix D infra.
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psychological and somatic effects, the physician can offer analogies
within the ready comprehension of the jury In any event, the medical
expert can be asked to explain the mechanics of the particular injury
and the effects of that injury on the nervous, mental, and somatic
state of the plaintiff. Comparison with the commonly experienced
disabilities is then possible.
For example:
A. Plaintiff sustained a blow to his left kidney which ruptured it,
causing pyelonephritis and later renal calculus. It was necessary
to perform a nephrectomy. The patient suffered lancmating and
flgurant pare.Q. Doctor, please explain that statement in simpler terms.
A. The injury to his kidney broke it open and caused infection to
set in because of the rentention of urine, due to impaired dram-
age. The recurrent infection, over a period of time, developed
stones in the kidney This condition required removal of that
kidney. The patient suffered sharp, darting and shooting pains.
The loss of one kidney requires him to refrain from any physical
activity which may subject him to back injury, which might
injure his only remaining kidney
The objective of the introduction of evidence as to the damages
caused by pam and suffering is, of course, to show the full measure
of the injury involved, which will always depend upon the total effect
of the particular damage caused upon the individual plaintiff.
Summation
In arguing to the jury about damages for pain and suffering, the
practices of attorneys will vary between states and even within a
given locality, reflecting the uncertain and diverse state of the law
Some jurisdictions prohibit counsel from suggesting any valuation
for pain and suffering on a formula or per diem basis and instruct
juries to determine the damages as their discretion dictates and as
under all the circumstances may be just and proper.25 Attorneys in
other jurisdictions will discuss the subject in great detail, using charts,
diagrams or blackboards for the computation of periods of time of
pain and suffering.20 Using this method, plaintiffs' counsel will sug-
gest a valuation to be placed on each unit of time of pain and suffer-
2 5 Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 95-103, 138 A.2d 713, 723-26 (1958).
2 6 See, e.g., Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 364
P.2d 337 (1961); Aetna Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 298 Ky. 706, 183 S.W.2d 637 (1944), aft'd,
300 Ky. 817, 190 S.W.2d 562 (1945); ABC Storage & Moving Co. v. Herron, 138 S.W.2d
211 (Tex. 1940).
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mg under the theory that if the jury can infer a dollar equivalent
from the evidence before it, counsel should be able to do the same?7
Advocates of this practice argue that "the very absence of a fixed
rule or standard for any monetary admeasurement of pame and suffer-
ing as an element of damages supplies a reason why counsel for the
parties should be allotted, on this item of damages, their entitled
latitude in argument-to comment on the evidence, its nature and
effect, and to note all proper inferences which reasonably may spring
from the evidence adduced."28
In following this method of argument counsel for plaintiff com-
putes the number of seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks, months
or years for which the particular injury has produced and will produce
pare and suffering. The selected unit of time is then assigned an esti-
mated, comparable economic value, expressed in cents or dollars per
unit, in a sum or sums selected by the attorney He may inform the
jury that the sum he selects is chosen for illustration purposes only and
that the jury must actually make the selection, or he may suggest this
figure to be the correct, fair valuation.
The jury is then urged to multiply this sum by the number of
time units to determine the amount of the damages. This method,
which is the nearest approach to a scientific or mathematical formul
currently in common use, is referred to as the "mathematical formula"
or the "per diem" method of computation.29
A number of objections to this method of argumentation have
been expressed. The foremost publication expressing such disapproval
is Jaffe's article, "Damages for Personal Injury- The Impact of In-
surance."80 Jaffe argues that pamn and suffering involve no economic
loss and are of indeterminate valuation, so that a defendant without
insurance should not be liable for plaintiff's experience of pain. Even
if there is insurance, he argues, such an uncertain amount should not
be assessed against the "pooled social fund of savings" when the
"compensation performs no specific economic function."3'
The outstanding judicial rejection of the per diem method of
calculation of damages for pain and suffering is Botta v. Brunner.82
The court held it nproper for counsel to (1) suggest to the jury
27 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 155, 161 (Ky. 1960).
2 8 Ratner v. Amngton, 111 So. 2d 82, 89 (Fla. 1959).
29 See Appendix C infra.
80 18 LAw & CoNqmT. PaoB. 219 (1953).
31 Id. at 225.
82 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
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by mathematical formula the amount to be awarded per minmute,
hour or day of conscious pamn and suffering; (2) use blackboards or
charts exhibiting to the jury calculations of specific amounts which
in the view of counsel should be awarded for pamn and suffering; or
(3) state in argument that amount for which the suit is brought
by referring to the ad damnum clause in the complaint.
In order to examine the Botta reasoning, it is worthwhile to quote
directly from the opinon:
As had been indicated, pain and suffering have no known dimen-
sions, 3 mathematical or financial. There is no exact correspondence
between money and physical or mental injury or suffering, and the
varous factors involved are not capable of proof in dollars and cents.
For this reason the only standard for evaluation is such amount as
reasonable persons estimate to be fair compensation [citing cases].
Neither the plaintiff in the case nor anyone else in the world has
ever established a standard of value for these ills. The only proof
ever received to gide the jury in determining the amount of the
allowance they should make is, broadly stated, the nature and extent
of the injury, its effect and results. They are instructed to allow a
reasonable sum as compensation, and in determining what is rea-
sonable under the evidence to be guided by their observation, ex-
perience and sense of fairness and right. At the best the allowance
is an estimated sum determined by the intelligence and conscience
of the jury and we are convinced that a jury would be much more
likely to return a just verdict, considering the estimated life as one
single period, than if it should attempt to reach a verdict by dividing
the life into yearly periods, setting down yearly estimates, and then
reducing the estimates to their present value. The arbitrariness and
33 Autbor's Note: This statement is incorrect because pain can be measured as to
its character, severity, duration and effect on the patient, by mechaical devices, physical
and medical tests, the observations and measurement by physicians and even observations
of laymen. "The facial expression of true pame-the pinched features, the pallor, the
clammy skin, the dilated pupils, the knotted brow-cannot be initated by the malingerer:
these, with the intermittent involuntary cry or groan and the characteristic writhing or
bodily contortions, present an unmistakable picture of suffering." MAcBRYDE, SIGNS AN
SYMPTOMS 10-11 (1952). Prolonged, intense pain may affect the heart and thus alter
the T-wave of an electrocardiogram. BoNicA, TAE MANAGEMNT OF PAIN 980 (1953).
Blood pressure variations, either sharp rise or sharp drop, may be cAused by deep pain.
BEEcmm, MEsnnm- r OF SUBJEC EREsPoNSEs: QuANTIATvE EFFECTS OF DRUGS
7 (1959). Generally, respiration rate, metabolic rate and temperature increase with pain.
FINNEsON, DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGECMdENT OF PAN SYNDROMES 15 (1962). Limitation
of movement helps to evaluate the amount of pain. GAY, ATroRNL's TEirOoK OF
MEDIcINEf 11.43 (1960). While there is no exact, accurate measurement of pam, the
effects of pam on the individual can be accurately determined and measured. HAMDY,
WoiFF & GooDLL, PAIN SENSATIONS AND REAcTIONs (1952) (using the dolorimeter to
measure pamn thresholds and reactions).
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artificiality of such a method is so apparent that to require a juy
to apply it would, we think, be an absurdity8 4
This is a reversal of an earlier opinion by a lower court on the
same case, in which it was said:
Counsel may argue from the evidence to any conclusion which the
jury is free to arnve at, and we perceive no sound reason why one
of the most vital subjects at issue, the amount of recovery, should
not be deemed within the permitted field of counsel's persuasion of
the jury by argument. This, within reasonable limits, includes his
supporting reasoning, as in the present case, whether soundly con-
ceived on the merits or not. 5
A number of state and federal jurisdictions have rejected the
Botta rule," some unqualifiedly while others require a cautionary in-
struction to be given advising the jury to distinguish between evi-
dence and argument.37 The Colorado Supreme Court, for example,
said that, if the total amount claimed by the plaintiff and plaintiff's
34 Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 95-96, 138 A.2d 713, 720 (1958). (Emphasis
added.)85 Botta v. Brunner, 42 N.J. Super. 95, 108, 126 A.2d 32, 39-40 (1956).
36Pennsylvania R.R. v. Mc Kinley, 288 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1961); Gray v.
Evening Star Newspaper Co., 277 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Bowers v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 281 F.2d 953 (3d Cir.. 1960), afirmrmg 182 F Supp. 756 (D. Del. 1960); Haycock
v. Chrnstie, 246 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Drlick v. Imperial Oil Ltd., 141 F Supp. 388
(N.D. Ohio 1955), modified, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. dented, 352 U.S. 941
(1956); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Kines, 276 Ala. 253, 160 So. 2d 869 (1963);
Vanlandingham v. Gartman, 236 Ark. 504, 367 S.W.2d 111 (1963); Newbury v. Vogel,
151 Colo. 520, 379 P.2d 811 (1963); Perdue v. Watson, 144 So. 2d 840 (Fla. App.
1962); Ratner v. Arnngton, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959); Jensen v. Elgin, 31 Ill.
App. 2d 198, 175 N.E.2d 564 (1961); Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill. App. 2d 323, 173 N.E.2d
209 (1961); Evansville City Coach Lines, Inc. v. Atherton, 133 Ind. App. 304, 179
N.E.2d 293 (1962); Corkery v. Greenberg, 253 Iowa 846, 114 N.W.2d 327 (1962);
Louisville and Nashville R.R. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960); Little v. Hughes,
136 So. 2d 448 (La. App. 1961); Stanleigh Lebow & Cooper Motor Lines, Inc. v. Reichel,
231 Md. 421, 190 A.2d 642 (1963); Eastern Shore Pub. Serv. Co. v. Corbett, 227 Md.
411, 177 A.2d 701 (1962); Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961);
Flaherty v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R., 251 Minn. 345, 87 N.W.2d 633 (1958);
Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d 30 (1957); Arnold
v. Ellis, 231 Miss. 757, 97 So. 2d 744 (1957); 4-County Electric Power Ass'n v. Clardy,
221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954); Goldstein v. Fendelman, 336 S.W.2d 661 (Mo.
1960); Wyant v. Dunn, 140 Mont. 181, 368 P.2d 917 (1962); Johnson v. Brown, 75
Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 754 (i959); King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509
(N.D. 1961); Edwards v. Lawton, 244 S.C. 276, 136 S.E.2d 708 (1964), distingushuig
Harper v. Bolton, 239 S.C. 541, 124 S.E.2d 54 (1962); Chemical Express v. Cole, 342
S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Continental Bus System, Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S.W.2d
153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354
P.2d 575 (1960); Jones v. Hogan, 55 Wash. 2d 902, 351 P.2d 153 (1960); Affett v.
Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106 N.W.2d 274 (1960).
s7 Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d 575 (1960).
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life expectancy may be argued, there is no logical reason to forbid
the argument of the per diem formula.3 Ohio followed the weight3 9
of authority when its Supreme Court promulgated the most recent
rejection of Botta by allowing counsel to argue in terms of a mathe-
matical formula.40
In Califorma, some trial judges permit the per diem argument,
even against objection by defense counsel; others prohibit the use
of the formula only in the face of an objection by defense counsel;
and some prohibit the per diem argument in all cases. Many of those
in the latter category bar the mathematical formula in the mistaken
belief that such argument was prohibited by the State Supreme Court
in Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines.41 However, Califorma appellate
courts have never taken a stand on the Botta rule.42 For example, the
majority opinon in Seffert refused to pass on the question:
Defendant next complains that it was prejudicial error for plaintiffs
counsel to argue to the juy that damages for pain and suffering could
be fixed by means of mathematical formula predicated upon a per
diem allowance for this item of damages. The propriety of such an
argument seems never to have been passed upon in this state. In
other jurisdictions there is a sharp divergence of opinion on the sub-
ject. (See Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1331.) It is not necessary to pass on
the propriety of such argument in the instant case because, when
plamtifT's counsel made the argument in question, defendant's coun-
sel did not object, assign it as misconduct or ask that the juiy be
admonished to disregard it. Moreover, in his argument to the jury,
the defendant's counsel also adopted a mathematical formula type
of argument. This being so, even if such argument were error (a
point we do not pass upon), the point must be deemed to have
been waived, and cannot be raised, properly, on appeal. (State Rub-
bish, etc. Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 340 (240 P.2d 282).)43
Perhaps the misinterpretation of the Seffert decision stems from
the dissenting opinion which did follow the reasoning of Botta:
[T]his state has long recognized pain and suffering as elements of
damages in negligence cases (Zibbel v. Southern Pacific Co., supra,
160 Cal. 237, 250; Roeder v. Rowley, supra, 28 Cal. 2d 820, 822);
38 Newbury v. Vogel, 151 Colo. 520, 525, 379 P.2d 811, 814 (1963).
89 See Edwards v. Lawton, 244 S.C. 276, 136 S.E.2d 708 (1964); Annot., 60
A.L.R.2d 1347 (1958).
40 3 Ohio St. 2d 96, 209 N.E.2d 442 (1965).
4156 Cal. 2d 498, 506-07, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 166, 364 P.2d 337, 342 (1961).
42 See Sangumetti v. Moore Drydock Co., 36 Cal. 2d 812, 823-35, 228 P.2d 557,
564-77 (1951) (Carter, J., dissenting).
43 Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 509, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 168,
364 P.2d 337, 344 (1961).
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any change in this regard must await re-examination of the prob-
lem by the Legislature. 44
Counsel may argue all legitimate inferences from the evidence,
but he may not employ arguments that tend primarily to mislead
the jury [Citations.] A specified sum for pamn and suffering for
any particular period is bound to be conjectural. Positing such a
sum for a small period of time and then multiplying that sum by
the number of days, minutes or seconds in plaintiffs life expectancy
multiplies the hazards of conjecture. Counsel could arrive at any
amount he wished by adjusting either the period of time to be taken
as a measure of the amount surmised for the pain for that period.
The absurdity of a mathematical formula is demonstrated by ap-
plying it to its logical conclusion. If a day may be used as a unit
of time in measuring pain and suffering, there is no logical reason
why an hour or a minute or a second could not be used, or perhaps
even a heartbeat If one cent were used for each second of pain
this would amount to $3.60 per hour, to $86.40 per twenty-four hour
day, and to $31,536 per year. The absurdity of such a result must
be apparent, yet a penny a second for pain and suffering might not
sound unreasonable The use of the formula was prejudicial
error. [Citations] 45
In so arguing, the Honorable Chief Justice did not consider a
unanmous opinion of the intermediate appellate court which had
decided Botta, wherein it was stated:
Counsel may argue from the evidence to any conclusion which
the jury is free to arrive at, and we perceive no sound reason why
one of the most vital subjects at issue, the amount of recovery, should
not be deemed within the permitted field of counsel's persuasion of
the jury by argument. This, within reasonable limits, includes this
supporting reasoning, as in the present case, whether soundly con-
cei'ved on the merits or not.46
Critique
Let us re-examine the premises of the Botta decision. The reader
will recall that the New Jersey court started from the position that
pain and suffering have "no known dimensions, mathematical or
financial."47 The validity of this statement must be subjected to a
two-stage analysis.
First, the statement assumes that pain and suffering are incapable
of measurement. It is true that it is impossible to measure these forms
of damage directly No one can stand the plaintiff in front of a ma-
44 Id. at 511, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 169, 364 -P.2d at 345.
45 Id. at 514, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 171, 364 P.2d at 347.
46 Botta v. Brunner, 42 N.J. Super. 95, 108, 126 A.2d 32, 39-40 (1956).
471d. at 95, 138 A.2d at 720.
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chine and calculate the intensity of his pamn. However, it is possible
to measure the pamn and suffering indirectly Pam and suffering main-
Lest themselves in physiological results. The most common manifesta-
tion is the involuntary cry or groan obvious to the most inexperienced
layman. However, the physician can detect less conspicuous symp-
toms. Generally, the rate of respiration, the pulse rate, the metabolic
rate and the body temperature will all rise with an increase of pain.
Prolonged and intense pamn may affect the heart and thus alter the
T-wave of an electrocardiagram. Pallor, clammy sldn and dilated
pupils may become noticeable. Inhibition of body functions such as
the motion of a limb may aid the evaluation of pamn. Nervous and
emotional effects are identifiable and measurable. Thus, while there
is no direct, exact measurement of pamn, the effects of pamn upon the
individual can be accurately determined. These dimensions may be
commuicated to the jury by expert witnesses.48
Second, the statement assumes that pamn and suffering cannot be
converted into dimensions capable of translation into monetary terms.
Obviously, it is impossible to produce a formula by which a given
intensity of pamn may accurately be equated with a fixed number
of dollars. However, the character, severity, duration, and effect upon
the particular patient may be compared with concepts with which
the trier of fact is familiar. In addition to the measurement of the
physiological effects of the pamn, the expert witness can interpret
given reactions to pamn m terms of commonly understandable sensa-
tions and disabilities. Lay witnesses may be called upon to point out
the changes which the plaintiffs pamn and suffering have wrought
upon his personality, habits, and abilities.
Furthermore, it is not necessary to prove the extent of pamn and
suffering with the exactitude which the critics of the majority posi-
tion would require. There are many instances in which the law recog-
nizes that to require such positing of evaluation would preclude any
remedy at all and, for that reason, permits the use of an inexact
method.49 Certainly the reasonable man test is far from specific. One
48 See note 33 supra.
49 The fact that exact transmutation is not possible is no valid objection to compen-
sation for pain and suffering because (a) the standard suggested by the Botta court
contains no exactness-allowing the jury to determine a lump sum for pain and suffering;
(b) many other judicial problems are resolved by inexact methods-the reasonable
test, fair value of services, works of art, or heirlooms; (c) the law neither expects nor
requires such precision of evaluation as to preclude the availability of a remedy. Stott v.
Johnston, 36 Cal. 2d 864, 299 P.2d 348 (1951); Harris v. National Union of Marine
Cooks & Stewards, 98 Cal. App. 2d 733, 221 P.2d 136 (1950); Monroe v. Owens, 76 Cal.
App. 2d 23, 172 P.2d 110 (1946).
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may wonder what the "fair value" of services exactly is, and the
value of an heirloom is indeterminable. Thus, if it is conceded that
pain and suffering are part of the injury which a plaintiff may suffer,
it is anomalous to make of them a special exception to other stan-
dards of compensation.
The rule precluding the recovery of uncertain and speculative
damages applies only to situations wherein the fact of damage is
itself uncertam. 50 Pam and suffering in their various forms are ele-
ments of the damage which, if proved, is compensable. While it is
the aim of the law to attain at least a rough correspondence between
the amount awarded as damages and the extent of the suffering, it
is a general principle that recovery for injuries will not be demed on
the ground that the amount of damages cannot be ascertained with
certainty, even though the award only approximates that amount.5'
.It is even more desirable that an injured person shall not be deprived
of substantial compensation merely because he cannot prove with
complete certainty the extent of harm he has suffered. Particularly
is this true in situations where there cannot be any real equivalence
between the harm and compensation in money, as in case of emo-
tional disturbance
The requirements vary with the possibilities for making a reasonably
exact estimate of the amount of harm measured in terms of money 52
One whose wrongful conduct has rendered difficult ascertainment
of damages cannot complain because loss occasioned by such con-
duct cannot be established with complete mathematical precision. 3
Moreover, the measure of damages for pain and suffering can
be removed from the realm of pure speculation. In recoveries for
the loss of such items as antiques, heirlooms, and works of art, it has
been necessary to establish a market value for these assets even
though they may never have been traded in the market place. Expert
testimony is used to demonstrate the amount a willing buyer would
pay and a willing seller would accept for such an article.5 4 Similarly,
freedom from pain is a valuable asset. Although it, too, is not traded
in the market place, it can be appraised. Expert testimony may be
used to show what potential sufferers would pay and what physicians
would charge for services and medications to relieve similar pamn
50 Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
51 Abraham v. Gendlin, 172 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
S2 Rm~TA 'mmrNT, TORTS § 912, comment a (1939). See Deevy v. Tassi, 21 Cal. 2d
109, 130 P.2d 389 (1942); Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 158 Cal. 499, 111
Pac. 534 (1910).
53 Smith v. Mendosa, 108 Cal. App. 2d 540, 238 P.2d 1039 (1952).
54 Chatterton v. Boone, 81 Cal. App. 2d 943, 185 P.2d 610 (1947).
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and suffering. For example, if a person would willingly pay five dollars
for freedom from pamn for one hour, as m the case of dental anesthesia,
or fifty dollars for freedom from pamn for several hours, as in the
case of appendectomy anesthesia, it might indicate a reasonable com-
pensation for similar pamn and suffering. Certainly it is indicative of
the value which society places upon the relief from the fear of pain, its
worry which preceeds the onset of pam, the anguish of the presence
of pam, and the worry caused by the prospect of continuing pamn
and disability r5 The kind and duration of this pamn and suffering
can be established with the reasonable probability which the law
requires through evidence which is available and acceptable for
proof.
Another potential manner of proof is the demonstration of the
value which plaintiff places upon his leisure or recreational time.
Enjoyment of the pleasures of living is a precious commodity A
major goal of our civilization is to bring good health, enjoyment, and
leisure time to our people. Implicit in this goal is enjoyment of plea-
sures free from pain. Thus, an indication of the value of freedom
from pamn for a given period of time may be the willingness of the
plamtiff to spend a given amount of money for a particular leisure
activity, such as bowling rates or green fees. Such evidence would
have the benefit of being within the "experience of the daily lives"
of the jurors. Such a benefit is most desirable.56
As a matter of logic, once a reasonable valuation for the compen-
sation of pamn and suffering for a given period of time has been es-
tablished, the award must be limited by the anticipated duration
of the pamn and suffering. A person who suffers such great pamn for
one day that it causes him to cry, writhe, perspire, walk the floor, and
be unable to sleep or eat well should be compensated for that one
day of pain and suffering. Another person who suffers such great
pain for three months that it causes him to cry, writhe, perspire, walk
the floor, and be unable to sleep or eat well should be compensated
for ninety times as much pain and suffering, assuming all other fac-
tors to be equal.
It is not sufficient to rely upon a statement that "the varieties and
degrees of pain are almost infinite" to bar an extrapolation of the
55 "Those who contend that there can be no reasonable relation between pamn and
suffering and any mathematical computation are unconvincing m a society where people
are constantly choosing between bearing pain or spending more to assuage it." Comment,
41 B.U.L. REv. 432, 435 (1961).
56 Caylor v. Atchison, T. & S.F Ry., 190 Kan. 261, 374 P.2d 53 (1962).
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pain and suffering of a particular time span to the anticipated dura-
tion of the damages. Proof of the particular variety and degree of
pamn and its effect upon the particular plaintiff in a given case may
be introduced. If "all other factors" are not equal, the differences
can be proved and argued by lawyers on both sides, and the jury
can consider these differences under the supervision of the judge.
The infinitude of the types and degrees of pamn and suffering is imma-
terial in view of the fact that it is the effect of the pamn and suffering
upon the individual which is being compensated. No objective con-
cept of the value of pamn and suffering in general is required, for
plaintiffs are not being paid for having pam. They are being compen-
sated for the effects of the pam.
It is interesting to note that Botta criticized the per diem rule for
its inexactness while abandoning a reasonable guideline which a jury
might use for the determiation of "unmeasurable" damages. Instead
of allowing the opposing counsel to argue to the jury the pros and
cons of a particular measurement of the award, the court would
have the jury be guided by "their observation, experience and sense
of fairness and right."57 It would seem to be the height of "absurdity,"
to borrow a term from the court, to say that a sum determined by the
intelligence and conscience of the jUry58 is less arbitrary, less artificial,
and less accurate than to allow the adversaries to establish guidelines
by argumentation.
The most recent pronouncement rejecting the Botta rule was on
July 9, 1965, in Grossnickle v. Village of Germantown,59 by the Ohio
Supreme Court. Even New Jersey has apparently retreated from the
rule of the second Botta decision by holding that plaintiff's attorney
may list on the blackboard, under the heading of pamn and suffering,
the number of days since the accident and the life expectancy of
the plaintiff.60
In the final analysis it is necessary to face the true issue directly:
should the "per diem argument for pamn and suffering" be allowed,
permitting higher verdicts to be returned, or should it be prohibited,
restricting the size of verdicts?"i It must be conceded that the law
5 7 Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 96, 138 A.2d 713, 720 (1958).
58 Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 364 P.2d
337 (1961).
593 Ohio St. 2d 96, 209 N.E.2d 442 (1965).
60 Cross v. Robert E. Lamb, Inc., 60 N.J. Super. 53, 158 A.2d 359 (1960).
61 Professor Kalven, in The jury, the Law and the Personal Injury Damage Award,
19 Onio ST. L.J. 158, 170 (1958) reports from his investigation of juries, that they think
m terms of total sum m personal injury awards rather than compensation for specific
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uniformly requires compensation for pain and suffering where proved
to exist. Ethical reason and the moral judgment of the community
influence the law as it develops by legislative or judicial process.
Thus, while damages for pain and suffering are said to have orig-
mated under primitive law as a means of punishing wrongdoers and
assuaging the feelings of those who had been wronged,62 the chang-
mg tenets of our society now hold it to be right that "for the breach
of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of damages ..
is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proxi-
mately caused thereby ."-3 Detriment includes pamn and suffer-
ag.6 4 The natural right of man to be secure in his person and prop-
erty protects us from political, criminal and civil wrongs. Our law
demands compensation for the property wrongfully taken or dam-
aged; it can be justly contended that it should equally require com-
pensation for the wrongful deprivation of good health and the en-
joyment of normal living.
In the last analysis it has been contended that the Botta rule
is unenforceable. This contention is demonstrated m Bower v. Penn-
sylvania R.R. Co.65 The procedure followed by counsel for plaintiff
in the Bower case has many possible variations which could be and
are followed in other cases. For example, counsel could argue that
the evidence proved the number of minutes or hours of the particular
suffering or disability of the plaintiff resulting from the accident and
remind the jury that it ought to compensate plaintiff for every second
of detriment suffered so the jury should decide how much to allow
He could then point out to the jury that when plaintiff played golf
for two and a half hours he was happy to pay six dollars green fees
components and, therefore, award little, if anything, for pain and suffering. He suggests
that a change in the law to deny such damages would have little significant effect on
awards.62 Morms, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLum. L. REv. 476, 478 (1959).
6 3 CAr. Crv. CoDE § 3333.
6 4 WEBse's NEw CoLeLaE.E Dic'roNARy (Merriam ed. 1961).
05 182 F Supp. 756 (D. Del. 1960), aff'd, 281 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1960). In this
case, counsel for plaintiff argued to the jury-
"Let me just say this, too. It is awfully difficult to give a jury a guide as to what
pain and suffering is. We can't really give you a guide as to what pain and suffering is
worth, but we do know this from the evidence: We know that Mr. Bowers, when he was
working for the railroad, got $2.77 an hour. Now, $2.77 an hour is what Mr. Bowers
was paid in the present market for doing what he liked to do Now, I can't tell
you what Mr. Bowers should be paid per hour, per day, per week, per month, for doing
something that he doesn't like to do, for going through pain, going through suffering,
but just consider what he did get paid for doing what he wanted to do." Id. at 758-59.
A similar argument was allowed in Edwards v. Lawton, 136 S.E.2d 708 (S.C. 1964).
South Carolina follows the Botta rule, but the court held the argument acceptable.
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and six dollars for the caddy A jury could of its own volition apply
the formula method and thereby reach a verdict without anyone else
knowing about it.
Fear has been expressed that permitting the per diem argument
for pamn and suffering will mislead the jury, will lead to a verdict based
on something other than evidence, and will allow counsel to invade
the province of the Jury " On the other hand, it is pointed out that
juries already have, even in Botta jurisdictions, the right to adopt a
"formula" method for determining damages for pain and suffering
without any suggestion of amount by any counsel, if the evidence
indicates the period of time of suffering or disability 67 Furthermore,
juries usually reach the correct result, probably ninety-five per cent
of the time according to Erie Stanley Gardner 68 and ninety to ninety-
five per cent of the time according to the late Federal Judge Louis
F Goodman.6 9 A survey of jury cases in the Bay Area definitely in-
dicates that juries are not often swayed or misled.70
The primary purpose of argument by counsel is to enlighten the
jury 71 The scope of the trial lawyer's summation has always been
held to be broad. 2 Under the proper instruction by the court the jury
can be properly cautioned about such argument. Some suggested
instructions may be found m Appendix B to this article.
Conclusions
From the viewpoint of uniformity in awards, the only true enforce-
able alternatives to allowing the per diem argument are either legis-
lation elimmating compensation for pamn and suffering or substifu-
tion of a "commission" or "master" or "referee" system for court and
jury trials in determining awards in tort cases. The former would be
contrary to our American sense of justice and fair play because inno-
cent victims of tortious conduct would have something valuable taken
from them without compensation, as in the case of an unemployed
housewife who suffers a severe traumatic neurosis which drastically
curtails her activities and enjoyment of life; or a victim who derives
epilepsy from the injury, is able to function between seizures, but
66 Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
67 See text accompanying note 55 supra.
68GARNER, ThE CouRT OF LAST RESORT 121 (1952).
69 Goodman, In Defense of Our Jury System, Collier's, Apr. 21, 1951.
70 See Appendix B infra.
7188 C.J.S. Trial § 169 (1955).
72 Risley v. Lenwell, 129 Cal. App. 2d 608, 277 P.2d 897 (1954); Southard v.
Morns, 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 465,31 Ohio Dec. 684 (1913).
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suffers horribly during them and between them suffers from fear and
limitation of many activities; or a victim who is made extremely ner-
vous on a permanent basis by the injury, or who suffers from head-
aches or backaches to the extent that his enjoyment of life is greatly
curtailed. Society must decide if the wrongdoer should not be re-
quired to provide some compensation for the result of his negligent
conduct.
The Commission system, which would award compensation to
every injured person, regardless of fault, but would make no award
for parn and suffering, is criticized for the same reasons stated above;
it is contrary to our mores and sense of fair play and, according to a
scholarly study reported in the American Bar Association Journal,
the results of trials by jury were reported to be more equitable and
satisfactory than those in trials by commission. 3
The solution to the increasing cost of accidents lies in better
driver education and licensing requirements, safer highways, safer
construction of automobiles, more effective law enforcement on the
highways and prevention of inflationary costs of medical services and
automobile repairs. The charge that "high verdicts" are the sole or
chief cause of increased rates for public liability coverage has not
been supported by facts.7 4 The contention that the casualty insurance
industry loses money on public liability and property damage coverage
is incorrect.75
Finally, it is necessary to have greater confidence in our judicial
system and in our trial judges. They can control conduct and pro-
cedures during trial to avoid the misleading of juries, to avoid appeals
to bias or prejudice, and, in case of unjustified and excessive verdicts,
to see that justice is done. The argument that jurors may mistake
the arguments of plaintiff's counsel for evidence is not persuasive;
the law presumes that jurors have sufficient mental capacity to dis-
criminate between evidence and argument.76 Until the law governmng
damages is changed, we must forthrightly strive to enforce uniform
application of existing law in order to provide equal justice to liti-
gants in every court in the land.
73 Conard, Workmen's Compensation: Is It More Efficient than Employer's Liabil-
ity?, 38 A.B.A.J. 1011 (1952).
74 Appleman, Jury Verdicts and Insurance Rates, Bests Insurance News (Oct. 1962).
75 The Spectator, an authoritative insurance magazine, reported in its October, 1963,
issue that, during the decade 1953-62, 100 insurance companies, representing the entire
casualty industry, have shown a total $2.7 billion profit from underwriting and investing.
76See Chemical Express v. Cole, 342 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961);
Continental Bus System, Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
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Appendix A
"The general rule in wrongful death cases denies recovery for the value
of society and companionship of the deceased on the ground that it cannot
be deemed a pecuniary loss, although recovery is permitted for the pecum-
ary loss of advice, training and guidance. In California, however, the jury
may consider the pecuniary benefits which nnght reasonably have been
expected from the continuance of the society, comfort and protection of
the deceased." 77
"When the death of a person not being a minor, or when the death
of a minor person who leaves surviving him either a husband or wife or
child or children or father or mother, is caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another, his heirs or personal representatives may maintain
an action for damages against the person causing the death . "T8
"The theory of the California wrongful death statute79 is that the heirs of
the decedent may recover for the pecuniary loss of the present and probable
future benefits of any kind. These include (a) the present value of future
contributions; (b) the value of any personal service, advice or training
that would probably have been given; (c) the value of the deceased's
society and compamonship."80
'In [a wrongful death case] general damages are measured [in part]
by the monetary equivalent of loss of comfort, society and protection."8'
"The death of a mother or father also causes a special loss to the children,
who may recover the value of advice and services in their training and
education."8 2
The elements of such damages are determined by considering "the
772 WrrxiN, SurmmARY or C.raroRNA LAw 1616 (1960), citing: Williams v.
McDowell, 32 Cal. App. 2d 49, 89 P.2d 155 (1939); Griffey v. Pacific Elec. By. Co., 58
Cal. App. 509, 209 Pac. 45 (1922). See also Newton v. Thomas, 137 Cal. App. 2d 748,
291 P.2d 503 (1955).
78 CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 377.
79 Ibid.
80 2 WrrniN, Summ my or CAIoRNA LAw 1616 (1960). See Bond v. United R.R.,
159 Cal. 270, 113 Pac. 366 (1911); Ure v. Magglo Bros. Co., 24 Cal. App. 2d 490, 75
P.2d 534 (1938); RESTATEmET_, TORTS § 925, comment b (1939); Killion, Wrongful
Death Actions in California, 25 CAnr. L. 1Ev. 170, 174 (1937); Developments sn the
Law)--Damages, 61 HARV. L. REv. 113, 166 (1947).
s1 Stathos v. Lenuch, 213 Cal. App. 2d 52, 56, 28 Cal. Rptr. 462, 465 (1963).
822 WrniN, Sumtny or CAT-wowuI LAw 1617 (1960); Johnson v. Southern
Pac. R.R., 154 Cal. 285, 97 Pac. 520 (1908); Redfield v. Oakland Consol. St. By., 110
Cal. 277, 42 Pac. 822 (1895). In Newton v. Thomas, 137 Cal. App. 2d 748, 291 P.2d
503 (1955), the court approved this instruction: "Another factor to be considered in
cases involving damages for loss of a member of a family, is that although damages must
be measured by the pecuniary loss to the plaintiffs, mn fixing such loss the trier of fact is
not limited to proof of loss mn dollars and cents, but may properly consider the pecuniary
value of the loss of such non-economic interests of a family as loss of comfort, society and
protection." Id. at 769-70, 291 P.2d at 516.
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disposition of the deceased, whether it was kindly, affectionate or other-
wise"; 3 it does not include "sorrow, mental distress and grief." 4
In the death of a minor, the law permits compensation to the parents
for "pecuniary loss . suffered (past and future) by being depnved of the
comfort, society and protection of the child."8 5
831 CA iroRNiA Juny INsTRuc-noNs Civil § 175-B (4th ed. 1956). In Fuentes v.
Tucker, 31 Cal. 2d 1, 187 P.2d 752 (1947), the rule is approved without comment: "In
an action for wrongful death of a minor child the damages consist of the pecuniary loss
to the parents in being deprived of the services, earnings, society, comfort and protection
of the child." Id. at 5, 187 P.2d at 755 (citing Bond v. United R.R., 159 Cal. 270, 113
Pac. 366 (1911)).
84 1 CrIFOwuaA Jtrny INsTRuc'roNs Civil § 175-D (4th ed. 1956).
85 1 CA x.RNor PuJay INsTRucnTONs Civil § 176 (1964 Pocket Part, revised); Da
Silva v. J. M. Martinac Shipbuilding Corp., 153 Cal. App. 2d 397, 314 P.2d 598 (1957).
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Ladies and gentlemen of the jury"
The law gives the lawyer the privilege of assisting you by permitting
him to discuss the evidence and the law and to suggest to you answers to
problems which nght perplex you and impede your work as jurors.
One of the most important and difficult phases of your duties requires
you to consider and weigh the evidence and to determine the nature and
extent of the detriment inposed upon plaintiff by the negligence of the
defendant. His Honor will define "detriment" for you and you will find
that the law says that "detriment" is a loss or harm suffered in person or
property The law also provides that one injured through the negligence
of another, as in this case, is entitled to be compensated for all the det-
riment proximately caused by such negligence.
You will note in the instruction of law which the judge will give that
the law requires compensation be awarded to the plaintiff for "all" the
detriment caused by the accident. This instruction will include informa-
tion about the various elements which constitute the detriment. These
elements are to be considered, measured, and compensated for if proved
to exist and to result from the negligence of the defendant. These elements
wich constitute the detriment will include loss of earnings and earning
capacity, medical expenses, and pain and suffering.
Pain and suffering will be defined to you by the judge and you will find
that it includes mental angtush and emotional distress, decreases in body
function and decrease in the enjoyment of living, worry, anxiety, embar-
rassment, fright, and the suffering that accompanies and follows injury
and pain.
The evidence in this case clearly proves (evidence is
reviewed on each of these elements).
The law requires that you measure this pain and suffering, as well as all
other detriments, evaluate it and arrive at a lump sum award for the total
verdict. Now you can go into the jury room and discuss the matter among
yourselves, each one suggest some figure that, in your opimon would be fair,
and then armve at one figure upon which you all agree. However, a more
accurate and scientific method would be for you to consider the evidence
and determine what was the actual pain and suffering of the plaintiff, past,
present and future. The undisputed evidence showed that plaintiff suffered
pain when this ten-ton truck violated the law by going through the red
traffic signal, ran into plaintiff and caused the injuries which were so clearly
described to you by the three physicians who testified. Did the evidence
show that he has recovered from these severe injuries? It is undisputed that
he has not. Does the evidence show that he will be able to live a normal
life in the future without pain and suffering? It is clear that he will not.
Therefore, you have uncontroverted evidence that plaintiff has suffered
severe pain every waking moment since the accident, except when narcotics
and opiates and anesthesia have been able to give him some little respite
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [vol. V7
from the torments of pamn that have wracked his body The evidence shows
that every waking hour, yes, every waking minute and every waking second,
plaintiff has suffered continuing pamn until this very day, this very minute.
You have seen him in court and on the witness stand, and you can judge
for yourselves the ordeal that plaintiff is bravely enduring because of the
pain that is wracking Ins body
No one can deny that plaintiff is suffering detriment. No one has sought
to deny that it was caused solely and proxinately by the violation of law
and the collision between the defendant's truck and plamtifFs body No one
could with any sincerity deny that plaintiff will have this same, unrelenting,
pain and suffering for the rest of his life, unless he chooses to become an
invalid and remain motionless for the rest of Ins life.
With these facts being proved, we have proved to you that plaintiff will
suffer from pamn for the rest of his life. He has a life expectancy of thirty
years. These tirty years would have been years of work, pleasure, recreation,
relaxation, fishing, hunting, golfing, bowling, playing with the children,
dancing with his wife had it not been for the tragedy, the negligence and
the collision. Instead they will be filled with pamn and suffering, doctors,
nurses, medicines, narcotics, sleeping medicines, pamn medicines, and pamn,
humiliation, worry, fear, nervousness and wretchedness. For this the law
requires that plaintif, the innocent victim, be compensated.
Our system of fair play and American justice entitles us to preserve our
body and its health and our abilities and our hope for the future. When these
things are wrongfully taken from us by a wrongdoer, and the law labels a
negligent driver who violates the law by going through a red traffic signal
such a wrongdoer, we are entitled to be compensated for the loss.
The loss to plaintiff is a loss in living capacity People live by the second,
minute, hour or day, therefore, the computation of his damages must neces-
sarily be accomplished by considering those units of time if you are to do
justice and compensate him for all the detriment caused to him by this
collision.
To do this, you need to go to the jury room and figure out how many
seconds, minutes, hours or days of pamn and suffering were proved by the
evidence to have been suffered by the plaintiff: (1) From the time of the
accident up to the present time; and (2) how many seconds, minutes, hours
or days more pamn and suffering must be endured from the present and for
the remainder of Ins life. Do not choose the moments of his worst pamn and
suffering. Choose the moment of the least pamn and suffering. (Review the
evidence.) (Computation may be on a prepared chart, placed on the black-
board or left to the jury ) When you compute this figure you must arrive at a
fair and just sum to award for each second, minute, -hour or day of pain and
suffering. How do you decide this? The law says you shall determine this
from the evidence, your own knowledge of human affairs and your own
experiences in life. However, there was no witness who suggested an amount
to award for the pamn and suffering of the plaitiff because the law neither
permits nor requires such testimony. But each of you has had some experi-
ence with pain or with avoiding pamn, and you know the cost of avoiding
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pain. For example, when you have a tooth which needs to be extracted, a
dentist might charge 3 to 5 dollars for admimstering anesthetic. Or the
anesthetist may charge 35 to 50 dollars for anesthesia for an appendectomy,
giving freedom from pain for one day No one would elect to suffer the
pain to avoid the charge.
In this case, applying the yardstick you have in your own experiences in
life and your own knowledge of human affairs, you can agree that ten dollars
a day is certainly not excessive for twenty-four hours, 1440 minutes of pain
and suffering. That isn't even one cent per minute. But, you the ]ury must
select the figure that is fair compensation for each second, minute, hour, day,
year for the pain and suffering that plaintiff will endure for the rest of his
life.
Appendix D
MEDICAL TESTIMONY ON PAIN AND SUFFERING
What indications did you find to indicate the presence of pain?
Where was the pain located?
How large an area did it affect?
Did it come on suddenly or gradually9
In your medical opinion what caused the pain?
Did it remain in one place or radiate?
Why did it radiate (if it did)?
To what parts did it radiate?
Can doctors determine the character and severity of pain?
Describe the different character of pain.
Describe the difference in severity of pain.
Were you able to determine the character and severity of pain in this
case?
Describe it.
How did you determine it?
Was the pain treatable?
What treatment did you perform or prescribe for it?
Did the pain require analgesics, opiates or sedatives?
Did these relieve the feeling of pain?
To what extent?
What was the duration of the different levels of pain? (The severe pain;
the moderate pain; the mild pain; no pain.)
When did each occur?
What time of day did each occur?
Was the pain related to activity or other symptoms?
Describe the present condition of plaintiff as to pain.
What is prognosis for plaintiff in regard to future pain?
What was the effect of this pain on plaintiff's working and living activities
in the past?
What will be the effect of pain on plaintiff's working ability in the future?
What will be the effect of pain on plaintiffs living ability in the future?
Will he be able to play golf, fish, hunt, bowl, hike, etc.?
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Appendix E
INSTRUCTIONS
I instruct you that the Opening Statements and Arguments or Summation
of Counsel are not evidence in the case. It is their duty to assist the jury by
discussing the evidence and the law In doing so they may cite examples or
illustrations which were not proved in the case, solely for the purpose of
assisting you to analyze the evidence in this case and to reach a fair and
just verdict based solely upon the evidence received in this court from the
witnesses and exhibits.
If either counsel has made any statement during the trial which is not
supported by the evidence, directly or by inference, you must disregard
such statement and be bound only by the evidence under the law as I state
it to you.
The attorneys have (plaintiff's attorney has), in their (his) summation
or argument, discussed amounts to be awarded as damages in this case.
Except where the attorney was citing evidence, or drawing an inference
which you find was supported by evidence in the case, such argument is not
evidence in the case and was suggested to you only by way of illustration.
You must distinguish between such argument and evidence in the case and
you may not use the argument unsupported by evidence as the basis for
deciding any issue or any matter in this case.
If your verdict is for the plaintiff, it shall be your duty to assess his
damages in an amount that will fairly and justly compensate him for all the
detriment he sustained as a result of the negligence of the defendant. Your
determination of this amount must be based on the evidence in the case, in
the light of your own experience and knowledge of human affairs. As to that
detriment which you find to be compensable in this case about which there
is no direct evidence regarding a valuation thereof, you must decide this
valuation by considering all the evidence in the case which relates to this
subject and determine what amount will fairly and justly compensate plain-
tiff for the damage caused him by that detriment.
The law recogmzes pam, suffering, impairment, disability and disfigure-
ment as separate elements of compensable damages, where you find them to
exist as a result of the negligence of the defendant.87
If your verdict be for the plaintiff, the law requires that he be awarded
compensatory damages for all detriment caused him by the negligence of
the defendant. The purpose of compensatory damages is to make the plain-
tiff whole again, to put hun in the same position that he was in immediately
prior to the accident in this case as far as a money judgment can do that.
Included in the elements of compensatory damages are the following ele-
ments of detriment, provided you find from the evidence that they occurred
or exist or will be reasonably probable to exist in the future as a result of this
87 The word "proximate" is intentionally omitted, and it is hoped that California
courts will follow the example of the Illinois courts in this regard, since this word carries
no cognizable significance to lay juries. See ILraNois PATTERN JURy INSTUc-roNS, Civil§§ 30.01-30.06 (1961).
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accident: physical pain, mental distress or suffering, npairment of health,
impairment of bodily function and efficiency, loss of earnings, profits or
earning power, loss of time, the reasonable value of sums expended or obliga-
tions icurred for medical care, examinations, treatment, in or out of
hospitals, and other elements which I shall mention later in my instructions.
No element of damage may be evaluated on the basis of guess, conjecture
or speculation. However, this does not mean that any witness should have
expressed a sum to be awarded for a particular element. In some cases no
testimony is allowed and the determination of the value to be placed upon
that given element of detriment is left to your determination from a con-
sideration of the evidence which is related to that subject and provides any
information about it, and in the light of your own experience and knowledge
of human affairs.88
I instruct you that the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to prove his
damages as I have previously instructed you regarding the burden of proof.
I instruct you that the burden of proof in the amount of damages rests
on the plaintiff also. This does not mean that he must prove the amount of
damages to a mathematical certainty because such proof is not possible in
this type of case as to all elements of damage which the law recognizes to
be compensable. It does mean that the plaintiff must produce evidence from
which you can arrive at a figure which is fair and just and reasonable under
all of the circumstances of the case.89
If your verdict is for the plaintiff, then in assessing damages for the plain-
tiff, you should take into consideration the character of the injuries sustained
by him; the nature, extent and severity of any such injuries, and if temporary
or permanent in nature. In estimating the amount of such damages, you may
consider the physical and mental pain suffered; the extent, degree and char-
acter of suffering, mental or physical; and its duration and severity; also
physical or mental pamn which you believe from the evidence he is reasonably
certain to suffer in the future from the same cause.90
While the law says that a recovery may be had for mental suffering, it
means a recovery for something more than that form of mental suffering
described as "physical pain." It includes the numerous forms and phases that
mental suffering may take, which will vary in each case with the nervous
temperament of the individual, his ability to stand shock, the nature of his
injuries, whether permanent or temporary; mental worry, distress, grief,
mortification, Where they are known to exist, are proper component elements
of that mental suffering for winch the law entitles the injured party to redress
in monetary damages.91
You are instructed that in considering the damages for pain and suffering,
you are to take into consideration not only pain and suffering caused at the
8SAdapted from 7 Am. Jum. Pleading & Practice § 61 (1957); CAL. Civ. CoDE
§ 3281; Wiley v. Young, 178 Cal. 681, 174 Pac. 316 (1918).
89 Adapted from 7 Am. Jun. Pleading & Practice § 61 (1957).
90 Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 158 Cal. 499, 507, 111 Pac. 534, 537
(1910); 14 CAL. Jxm. 2d Damages §§ 124, 150-54 (1954).
91 Graham v. Yellow Cab Co., 125 Cal. App. 141, 13 P.2d 773 (1932); Merrill v.
Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 158 Cal. 499, 111 Pac. 534 (1910).
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time of the accident, but also the pain and suffering reasonably probable to
be endured in the future, which are the result of the accident.
You are further instructed, that in order to award the plaintiff damages to
compensate hun for pain and sufferng, heretofore suffered or reasonably
probable to be suffered by plaintiff in the future and caused by the accident,
it is not necessary that any of the witnesses should have expressed an opinion
as to the amount of such damages for pain and suffering, but you the jurors
may make such estimate of the damages from the facts and circumstances
in evidence and by considering them in connection with your own knowl-
edge and experience in the affairs of life.
You are further instructed that with regard to pain and suffering the law
prescribes no definite measure of damages, but the law leaves such damages
to be fixed by you as your discretion dictates and as under all the circum-
tances may be just and proper.92
You are instructed that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to have intro-
duced evidence as to the monetary value of any pain, suffering, or disability
suffered by him, but it is only necessary that he should prove to you the
nature and extent of such injury, pain, suffering, disability, impairmnent and
disfigurement, and it is for you the jury, using your own judgment, sense
and experience, to estimate the monetary value of such pam, suffering, dis-
ability, impairment and disfigurement.93
Such sum as will compensate hun reasonably for any pam, discomfort,
fears, anxiety, and other mental and emotional distress suffered by him and
resulting from the injury in question and for such like detriment as he is
reasonably probable to suffer in the future from the same cause.94
You will consider not only the elements of damage heretofore mentioned,
but you will award plaintiff also such sum as will compensate said plamtiff
reasonably for any loss of earning power occasioned him by the injury in
question, and from which he is reasonably probable to suffer in the future.
In fixing this amount you may consider what said plamtiffs health, physical
ability and earning power were before the accident and what they are now,
the nature and extent of his injuries, whether or not they are reasonably
probable to be permanent, or if not permanent, the extent of their duration,
all to the end of determining the effect of his injuries upon his future
earning capacity 95
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